Urbanisation Is Sea

SE1101E Group Essay Rural-Urban migration, or â€Å"urbanization†, has led to a better life for a majority of Southeast Asians. To what extent is this true? Discuss your answer using examples from at least three different Southeast Asian societies to illustrate your points. ____ Introduction For the longest time, Singaporeans lived in a relative urban oasis – coined, praised and awarded as the ‘Garden City’. Even so, in the last 2 years, Singaporeans have experienced the stress of continued urbanization, created primarily through migration.This stress has been manifested physically as inadequate infrastructure, socially as rising xenophobia and politically as rising discontentment, leading to the long-ruling People’s Action Party to face its worst electoral performance since independence in 1965. It is this backdrop that propelled our group to comparatively examine the urbanization experiences of three of Southeast Asia’s largest countries, an d evaluate the outcomes. Firstly and most importantly, it is important to delineate the two key terms – â€Å"rural-urban migration† and â€Å"urbanization†.While â€Å"rural-urban migration† is a subset of â€Å"urbanization†, urbanization as a process is far more encompassing, as Terry McGee has noted to include the expansion and encroachment of urban regions into formerly rural areas through land-use conversion practices. For the scope of this essay, we will limit our arguments to the process of â€Å"rural-urban migration†. The process of migration is simply defined by Zelinsky as â€Å"a permanent or semipermanent change of residence†.Petersen offers a sociological perspective, defining migration as â€Å"a spatial transfer from one social unit or neighbourhood to another†. Extending these, rural-urban migration can be broadly defined as the movement of people from rural home locations to urban locations, which results in socio-economic impacts for â€Å"both the origin and destination societies†. This includes circulatory migration, where rural migrants return to their home location after a period in the urban location, and permanent relocation from the rural location to the urban location.Further to this, to achieve a manageable scope of discussion, we have elected to focus on (domestic) rural-urban migration, where the rural and urban locations are located within the same country, as opposed to the processes of transnational (and regional) rural-urban migration. In this essay, we will argue that while the process of rural-urban migration has created a better life for some, it has not necessarily created a better life for the majority of Southeast Asians especially when evaluated on a holistic level. Specifically, we will use the case studies of Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines to support our argument.These three countries were selected as their combined populations of over 400 millio n, consist a majority 65 per cent of Southeast Asia’s 620 million people, in addition to their relative comparative congruence within the extremely diverse Southeast Asian region. Secondly, this essay strives not to be an ideological critique of the processes of â€Å"rural-urban migration† and â€Å"urbanization† but rather, serve as a comparative exposition on the impacts of rural-urban migration in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines and provide an objective evaluation of whether this process has created a â€Å"better life† for the â€Å"majority of Southeast Asians†.Aptly congruent, Tjitoherijanto and Hasmi describe urbanization as an expression of â€Å"people’s desire for a better life† and â€Å"must be recognized as a natural modern process by which humans attempt to improve their welfare†. The central themes of what is â€Å"a better life†, has rural-urban migration created it and for whom, form the framewo rk of our discussion. Case Study: The Philippines In our first case study, we analyze the Philippines. The state of urbanization in the Philippines is comparatively the most advanced of the three case studies, with 33 highly urbanized cities and 4 surpassing the 1 illion-population mark. While the 2010 census depicts the state of urbanization in the Philippines, it does not describe the flow of domestic rural-urban migration. From 1970 to 1990, the percentage of the Philippine population identified as â€Å"urban† surged from 36% to 52%, which further increased to 59% by 2000. Not all of this growth can be attributed to rural-urban migration. In fact, 47. 2% is actually due to reclassification of formerly rural areas as urban and natural urbanite population growth.While explicit data is sparse, Hugo provides a basis to assume that the remaining and majority 52% of this urban growth, is likely due to rural-urban migration. In tandem with rising urbanization, cursory economic i ndicators also rose. GDP increased from USD 6. 6 billion in 1960 to USD 199. 5 billion by 2010. Even with considerable population growth, GDP per capita also grew during the same period, from USD 692 to USD 1,383. Nakanishi forwards that the rural sector conditions in the Philippines, where peasants do not own their land, are â€Å"insupportable† and conditions in the city, though not the best, are an improvement.Knight and Song, who compute the Philippine’s urban-to-rural income ratio to be 2. 26, give further credence to the possibility, that perhaps, rural-urban migration might create a better economical life for rural migrants, and for all Filipinos too. These quantitative indicators are, however, quickly problematized as overly simplistic. To begin, consider the Gini coefficient, which measures the inequality of income distribution. For the Philippines, this stood at 0. 46 in 2010; the income share held by the top 10% was 36% while the income share held by the bot tom 10% was only 2%.This significantly unequal distribution of income evidences that the benefits associated with economic growth has not reached and has not benefitted a vast majority of Filipinos. Also, counterintuitively, higher income levels in urban areas do not actually lead to economic improvement on all accounts, as the Harris-Todaro model establishes. Simply put, the wage differential between the urban and rural areas (2. 26 in the case of the Philippines) compels rural populations to igrate to urban areas despite urban unemployment which further, and continually, increases unemployment, as long as urban wage levels continue to exceed that of rural areas. This thesis holds true in the Philippines context, where even as unemployment rates rose from 5% in 1980 to 11% by 2000, rural-urban migration continued to rise. This self-perpetuating cycle is particularly significant as it confirms that rural-urban migration, far from leading to a better life, actually results in the opp osite. Rising unemployment creates further problems.One is the creation of urban slums, where the poorest rural migrants generally live. In fact, from 2000 to 2006, urban slums grew at a rate of 3. 5%, faster than the urban population growth rate of 2. 3%. This evidences that rural-urban migration (which generates the majority of urban population growth) creates negative socioeconomic ripple effects, which compound with time, noting that rural-urban migration began in the 1960s in the Philippines. In Manila alone today, 35% of the 12 million population live in slums.Urban slums, which are â€Å"characterized by poor sanitation, overcrowded and crude habitation, inadequate water supply, hazardous location and insecurity of tenure†, have been recognized to lead to widespread environmental degradation. Most prominently, the lack of proper sanitation and sewerage services in slums contaminate citywide and nationwide water supplies, creating over 38 million cases of life-threateni ng diarrhea in the Philippines every year. This is despite the percentage of urban population with access to sanitation in the Philippines increasing from 69% in 1990 to 79% in 2010.This contradiction recalls Ulrich Beck’s pithy quote â€Å"smog is democratic†; that environmental impacts (linked to rural-urban migration and its ensuing employment) created by a small segment of the population can degrade the quality of life for a significant majority, in a ripple-like effect. However, ripple effects can work both ways, and in a positive sense too. One common example is that of the increased literacy rate as a result of rural-urban migration. From 1980 to 2000, the literacy rate increased from 84% to 93%. The literature is clear; generally speaking, a higher literacy ate and education level are two of the most significant positive externalities of rural-urban migration. The causation link between rural-urban migration and literacy is primarily due to the higher accessibi lity of schools in urban regions, which allow rural migrants in urban centers to more readily access schooling. This causation is however, problematic in the Philippines, where there is no wide disparity in literacy rates between rural and urban areas that would support such a causation thesis. The primary school net attendance rate in rural areas was only marginally lower at 86%, compared to 89% in urban areas.Some theorists have hypothesized that a strong historical cultural emphasis on education in the Philippines is one reason for this comparative equality in literacy rates in both urban and rural areas. Regardless, the lack of causation between rural-urban migration and literacy rates in the Philippines, further evidences that rural-urban migration, has not led to a â€Å"better life† for a significant majority of Filipinos. The discussion thus far surfaces a most important facet of the discussion – that of policy responses to rural-urban migration.It is apparent that the impacts created by the process of rural-urban migration might not be as deterministic as Harris and Todaro implied (their simplifying assumptions have been widely critiqued). It is crucial to note that the impact of the rural-urban migration process, whether positive or negative, is molded through the lens of government policy responses. In the case of the Phillipines, the indicator of increasing Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, was contradicted by a highly unequal distribution of income and rising unemployment.Policy intervention is thus required to equalize this. Also, the formations of slums are not a direct result of rural-urban migration but due to inept city planning and a lack of sufficient public housing, again demonstrating the collision between policy and process as fundamental to our discussion on the impacts of rural-urban migration. In sum, one last indicator, mentioned in passing at the beginning of this case study, of increased life expectancy, exempl ifies one of the themes stated at the outset – what constitutes a better life?Does increased life expectancy constitute a â€Å"better life†, or just a longer one? Based on the evidence presented, we are inclined to think it is the latter. While Philippines represent a country in a highly urbanized state, Thailand represents one on the other spectrum. As such, our next case study will examine the rural-urban migration pattern in Thailand. When we analyze the rural-urban migration of Thailand, we can roughly translate it to the rural-urban migration to Bangkok. This is due to Bangkok’s dominance and influence in the country’s political and economical landscape.The size distribution of cities in a country roughly abides to the â€Å"rank-size rule†: The second largest city is half the size of the first largest city and the third largest city is half the size of the second. In Thailand’s case however, the second largest city is a mere 6% the si ze of Bangkok. As such, it is not an overstatement to describe Thailand as a one-city state. Thus in this case study, we will examine the urban landscape with reference to Bangkok as a comparison. Thailand’s urbanization rate is at a low 38% , significantly lower than their peers such as Indonesia (53%) and Malaysia (71%) (percentage not accurate as of 2012.Need comparison and citation). This figure has stalled since 2007, only changing by 0. 8% between 2002 and 2009. This is because Bangkok has stopped growing. In fact, it has shrank by 1% between 2007 and 2009. As of late, Thailand’s urbanization trends began shifting away from Bangkok to the peripheral provinces such as Songkhla; Nakhon Si Thammarat and Surat Thani. As such, while the top 10 cities in the vicinity of Bangkok grew collectively by 17%, a 1% decrease in Bangkok has dropped that urbanization growth to a mere 0. 8%. These reflect how this single city is able to impact the country’s economy.As such we shall analyze the impact of urbanization by using Bangkok as our case study. The growth of Bangkok brings about social and economical progress, with economical taking priority. National income statistics from the NESDB have shown that though contributing a mere 15. 8 per cent of total population in 1988, Bangkok and its vicinity generated more than 50 per cent of the gross domestic product. Socially, the Bangkok and its neighboring region has enjoyed better health care (2. 12 hospital beds per residents, compared with 0. 38 per 1,000 residents in Sri Saket, the poorest province of Thailand. and higher access to water (About 12 percent compared with 1. 2 percent in North, 1. 4 percent in the South, and 0. 9 percent in the North-east. ) While the figures reflect an improvement in the quality of life, this may not translate into an improvement for the people. There exist an overlying assumption that there would be a trickle down effect to benefit the less well off. Dr. Puey, a famo us Thai economist observed otherwise. Thailand’s pursuit of economic growth has widened the rich-poor disparity where urbanized regions in Thailand have experienced economic benefits at the expense of villages.Furthermore, it is alleged that there has been a social tension within the rural community between the few who have benefitted and the majority who have not. Critics of these distributions of wealth have blamed the monopoly of capitalism from emerging corporations in finance and banking centered in Bangkok. On October 14, 1973, a student led uprising threw the exploitation of rural villagers in the spot light, highlighting the dissent over the rich-poor divide. Furthermore, Thailand has traded a social benefit for a social problem.As Bangkok swelled as the only go-to urban destination in the 1970s, Bangkok’s infrastructure failed to expand at the same pace as its growing population. Overpopulation and congestion were frequent social issues that the government had to address. The high influx also led to pollution, and by consequence, disease. As such, it may be argued that while the urban population enjoyed better health care services, there was also a higher propensity to get sick due to more frequent interactions and mass pollutions. As such, while the face value of urbanization reveals measurable benefits, the real value actually shows a decrease.This aforementioned issue indicates a situation where rural-urban migration works too well. Bangkok grew haphazardly without an official city plan until 1992, a growth necessitated by Economic interest. Accompanied by poor city planning is its poor infrastructure of roads, leading to massive traffic jams. BBC has ranked Bangkok as having one of the top ten worst traffic jams in the world. For residents in this urban landscape, such issues have become so commonplace that they have come to accept these problems as part of their everyday lives.The process of rural-urban migration, at least until 200 7, has played the role of an instigator that negatively impacted the lives of those living in the urban landscape. Hence, rural-urban migration has its pros and cons. However, while it is important to weigh the different opportunities offered due to rural urban migration, we should also consider how these citizens perceive these opportunities offered and whether they consider themselves better off. Here lies the paradox. Both rural and urban parties perceive themselves as beneficiaries to the rural urban migration.A collection of data from six rural villages in the Nong Muun Than and Phon Muang communes revealed that villagers overwhelmingly felt that they had came up on top compared to their urban counterparts. Villages were perceived to be better in terms of standard of living, the friendliness, the working conditions and the environment to raise children although they conceded that urban areas posed a better environment to specialize. On the contrary, urban areas felt that they b enefitted from better facilities, higher pay and wider job opportunities.As such, while visible problems exist in both rural and urban states, they remain predominantly contented. This approach, however, comes with its own associated problems. It fails to recognize social identity which compels participants to be more biased towards their own home society, and it also assumes all Thais are well-informed of the opportunities and problems offered in both societies. For example, villagers in a rural area may be contented with life, but they may still be unable to comprehend the benefits urban areas provide.Their contentment hence lies in their simplicity of thought rather than the effect of rural-urban migration. As such, we turn our attention to more obvious indicators while still taking account, albeit more cautiously, people’s perception of such benefits. Recognizing the growing rural-urban divide, the 9th developmental plan of Thailand explicitly tackles such rural-urban lin kages in the country. Longitudinal studies on migration patterns conducted by the Nang Rong Project and Kanchanburi Demographic Surveillance System (KDSS) were used to evaluate emerging problems faced by Thailand.It concluded that economical pull factors were the main cause of migration towards urban areas, although their search for financial stability came with a string attached. According to the DFG Bangkok Migrant Survey, (2010), 67 percent of migrants reported an improvement in living conditions since leaving rural areas while 60 percent of migrants reported stable income. However, 70 percent of migrants do not possess a written work contract and 80 percent of respondents have no insurance at all.Most of these migrants consist of family members forced to find work in urban areas due to rural poverty and hence migration was influenced not out of choice but rather that of necessity. As such, although they travel to urban regions in search of better prospects, their nature of trave l is necessitated for survival and their trip comes with little or no social safety net. Another issue they face is not simply acquiring employment, but rather quality employment. 70 percent of migrants earn less than 300 bahts (or $8) a day.While these still represents an increase in pay as compared to their rural counterparts, they also face a higher cost of living in an urban environment and therefor tend to spend more. Hence, most migrants aimed for quality employment, but only a mere 2 percent earn around 2. 3% fall in this category. 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